An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very stringent refinement of rationalizability.
Introduction
Rubinstein (1989) showed that equilibrium outcomes are highly sensitive to higher-order beliefs and in particular that actions which are equilibria under common certainty of payoffs are not necessarily equilibria (or even approximate equilibria) under "almost common certainty" in the sense of a high number of levels of certainty. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) extended this logic to rationalizability and showed that only if an action is the unique rationalizable action for a type can one show that it is rationalizable for * Princeton University, smorris@princeton.edu † Princeton University, satorut@princeton.edu ‡ Paris School of Economics, tercieux@pse.ens.fr all nearby types in the product topology over higher-order beliefs. Monderer and Samet (1989) argued that the discontinuity identified by Rubinstein (1989) disappears if one uses "common p-belief" as an alternative notion of approximate common certainty. In particular, they showed that if an action profile is an equilibrium under common certainty of payoffs, it is an approximate equilibrium (to any degree of precision) if there is common
(1 − ε)-belief about payoffs for sufficiently small ε > 0. happens to either this equilibrium or rationalizability result if we require full and not approximate rationality has not been much studied. Takahashi and Tercieux (2011) address the equilibrium case. This paper reports some new results for the rationalizability case.
We consider an incomplete-information environment where players have uncertainty about payoff functions but maintain common certainty of full rationality, given their beliefs about those payoff functions. We say that an action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has common (1−ε)-belief about payoffs for sufficiently small ε > 0.
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Under this definition, robustly rationalizable actions are always rationalizable, and conversely, every rationalizable action is robustly rationalizable in generic normal-form games. Robust rationalizability is, however, a very stringent refinement of rationalizability in sequential-move games, as illustrated in the following example. 1 Kajii and Morris (1997) considered a somewhat intermediate case, where types are generated by some common prior and players are mutually certain of their own payoffs with high probability. In this case, they showed that with high probability, there is common p-belief about payoffs with p < 1/|I|, where |I| is the number of players. 2 Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine (1988) and Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) , respectively, test the robustness of equilibria and rationalizable actions by checking if these actions are played in some sequence of incomplete-information games with "full support" on the set of possible payoff functions. Ely (2001) and Hu (2007) also consider actions that can be rationalizable in some incomplete-information environment with almost common certainty of payoffs. 
Here boldface numbers represent payoffs that differ from corresponding payoffs in the original game. hence the unique perfect equilibrium is not sufficient for robust rationalizability.
5
The goal of this paper is to provide a sufficient condition for robust rationalizability.
We say that an action is strictly rationalizable if it survives iterated elimination of actions that are not strict best responses to any conjecture over the remaining actions of the opponents. We show that every strictly rationalizable action is robustly rationalizable.
We also investigate how the notion of robust rationalizability is affected if we require that players be fully certain of their own payoffs. That is, we say that an action is Crobustly rationalizable (where C stands for Certainty) if it is rationalizable for every type who has common (1 − ε)-belief about certainty of own payoffs for sufficiently small ε > 0.
We show that unlike the original definition of robust rationalizability, the weakly dominant action, if it exists, is C-robustly rationalizable. More generally, a slight weakening of strict rationalizability is sufficient for C-robust rationalizability.
Several refinements have been proposed in the literature on rationalizability, such as 5 Note that type t 1 occurs with probability ε only. Thus, if one relaxed the definition of robustness and required that an action be played with high prior probability, one could argue that U is robustly rationalizable in this weaker sense. Similar definitions are adopted in Kajii and Morris (1997) and
Takahashi and Tercieux (2011). We do not take this route in this paper, for we are afraid of introducing ex-ante viewpoints in a setup with otherwise exclusively interim perspectives.
perfect rationalizability in Bernheim (1984) , cautious rationalizability in Pearce (1984) , Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) and Börgers (1994) , proper rationalizability in Schuhmacher (1999) , and weakly perfect and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability in Vannetelbosch (1999, 2000) . There are some technical differences between those concepts, but they all share the property that weakly dominated actions are eliminated. Unlike our notion of (C-)robust rationalizability, for each of such refinements, the set of rationalizable actions that pass the refinement is non-empty in every game. Among those papers, it is only Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) who explicitly formalize refinements as a question of rationalizability in incomplete-information games.
Definitions

Complete-Information Games
We consider a complete-information game G = (I, (A i , g i ) i∈I ), where I is the set of players, and for each i ∈ I, A i is the set of actions available to player i, A = i A i , and
A → R is his payoff function. We assume that both I and A are finite. The domain of g i is extended to A i × ∆(A −i ) in the usual way, where A −i = j =i A j and for each measurable space X, ∆(X) denotes the set of probability measures over X. For each (correlated) probability λ i ∈ ∆(A −i ),
be the set of best responses against λ i for player i.
We define rationalizability by iteratively eliminating actions that are not best responses to any conjecture about the remaining actions of the opponents. That is, let
, and for each n ≥ 1, let R n i be the set of best responses against R n−1
, that is, the set of actions a i ∈ A i that satisfy a i ∈ br i (λ i ) for some
} is a decreasing sequence (with respect to the set-inclusion order). Let R i = n≥0 R n i , and we say that any a i ∈ R i is (correlated) rationalizable. 6 Note that the profile (R i ) i∈I of the sets of rationalizable actions is characterized 6 In games with more than two players, correlated rationalizability is more permissive than independent by the largest profile (X i ) i∈I of sets that satisfies the following fixed-point property: for each i ∈ I, X i ⊆ A i is equal to (or a subset of) the set of all best responses against
Incomplete-Information Elaborations
We embed G into an incomplete-information environment. Let Θ be a finite set of payoff-relevant states, where each player i ∈ I has a state-dependent payoff function
) i∈I be the universal type space over Θ. Here, T i is the set of universal types, each of which specifies a hierarchy of beliefs, i.e., player i's belief over Θ, his belief about his opponents' beliefs about Θ, his belief about his opponents' beliefs about his opponents' opponents' beliefs about Θ, etc, and π i :
is the natural homeomorphism. 
be the set of player i's types who puts probability at least p on E −i × Ψ: 
Given (I, A, Θ, u), we can define an incomplete-information game on the universal type space T , where I is the set of players, T i is the set of types of player i, A i is the set of actions available to any type in T i , u i is his state-dependent payoff function, rationalizability as originally defined by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) , which requires that each player has a stochastically independent conjecture about the opponents' actions. 
and the domain of u i is extended to
, and we say that any a i ∈ ICR i (t i ) is interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) for type t i . Note that each ICR i is not a set of actions, but a correspondence that maps each type to a set of actions.
Robust Rationalizability
We say that an action is robustly rationalizable in a complete-information game if it is played in ICR for every type with almost common certainty of payoffs. 
we have a i ∈ ICR i (t i ). 8 Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) show that interim correlated rationalizability is invariant with respect to belief-preserving morphisms and thus defined without loss of generality in the universal type space.
, rationalizability is necessary for robust rationalizability. Here we explore a sufficient condition for robust rationalizability.
For this purpose, we define strict rationalizability in a complete-information game G. Strict rationalizability is similar to rationalizability, but in each step of iteration, we eliminate actions that are not strict best responses to any conjecture about the remaining actions of the opponents. That is, let R 
for any a i ∈ A i . Define the sequence {E 
Let µ i ∈ ∆(T −i × A −i × Θ) be a probability measure such that the marginal marg T −i ×Θ µ i is given by π i (t i ), and conditional on t −i and θ, action profile a −i is chosen according to 
. Then, by the choice of ε, a i is a best response against marg A −i ×Θ µ i . Thus
In Example 1 in the Introduction, we have R To see this, first note that X is strictly dominated by L. Once X is eliminated, actions Du and Dd are equivalent, hence neither Du nor Dd can be a strict best response to any conjecture over {L, R}. Thus both Du and Dd are eliminated. Then R is eliminated since L is the strict best response against U . We can show, however, that R is robustly rationalizable for player 2. More strongly, we can show that for any t 1 and t 2 with almost common certainty of θ * , ICR 1 (t 1 ) is either {U, Du, Dd}, {U, Du}, or {U, Dd}, i.e., ICR 1 (t 1 ) contains U as well as either Du or Dd (or both), whereas ICR 2 (t 2 ) = {L, R}. This is because type t 1 can rationalize either Du or Dd by conjecturing that player 2 plays R with high probability, while type t 2 can rationalize R by conjecturing that player 1 plays Du or Dd with high probability, without specifying which one to be played.
Certainty of Own Payoffs
In Example 1, for type t 2 to eliminate the weakly dominant action L in the original game, it was essential that she is not certain of her own payoffs. Instead, she puts a small but positive probability on the event that player 1's type is t 1 , and conditional on that event, R is no longer weakly dominated in her payoff function. In this section, we explore the implications of assuming that players are fully certain of their own payoffs.
Almost Common Certainty of Certainty of Own Payoffs
We define robustness of rationalizable actions with respect to types who are certain of their own payoffs. Let E * i be the set of player i's type who is certain that his own payoffs are given by g i : Proposition 2. Any strictly perfectly rationalizable action is C-robustly rationalizable. 9 Strictly perfect rationalizability is a rationalizability version of strictly perfect equilibria in Okada (1981) .
Proof. By the fixed-point property of (R sp i ), there exists ε > 0 such that for any i ∈ I, a i ∈ R sp i , and for µ i ∈ ∆(A −i ), there exists λ
The rest is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
In Example 1, R sp 1 = {U } and R sp 2 = {L}. It is easy to see that U (resp. L) is the unique C-robustly rationalizable action for player 1 (resp. player 2). 
Common p-Belief about Certainty of Own Payoffs
We can generalize the previous subsection and investigate, for a fixed value of p ∈ (0, 1), the robustness of rationalizability when there is common p-belief about certain of own payoffs. The following is a simple extension of Proposition 2 and hence the proof is omitted. ) and some µ i ∈ ∆(A −i ).
Concluding Remarks
We introduced the notion of robust rationalizability with respect to small uncertainty about payoffs. We then provided various sufficient conditions for an action to be robustly rationalizable, depending on which class of incomplete-information perturbations we use to test the robustness. As illustrated in a series of examples, none of these conditions is, however, a full characterization for (C-)robust rationalizability. It is left for future research to explore such if-and-only-if results.
As we pointed out in the Introduction, our analysis hinges crucially on the requirement of full rationality in the definition of ICR. If instead we use approximate rationality and define the set ICR δ i (t i ) of δ-ICR actions for type t i by relaxing the incentive constraint to
then, one can show that any rationalizable action a i ∈ R i is robustly rationalizable in the sense that, for any (Θ, u) and δ > 0, there exists ε > 0 such that for any t i ∈ CB under the product topology on the universal type space.
